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Abstract
DNS provides a critical function in the Internet infrastructure.
Since it is relied on by many Internet applications, security has
become a crucial problem in the DNS. Traditional rule-based
intrusion detection methods are not able to update the rules
dynamically.
In this work, cluster and histogram analyses are employed to
detect possible anomalies in DNS query traffic. The proposed
methods are used to reveal unusual patterns in a real-word DNS
log dataset captured at a country code top level domain server.
Experimental results on such log dataset are achieved and
compared performing the proposed algorithms on different query
parameters and with different time-bin sizes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a fundamental Internet in-
frastructure that associates informations to domain names. The
most common use case is when DNS binds a human-readable
domain name to an IP address. This mapping between do-
main names and IP addresses of network locations is critical
to many Internet applications, such as web browser and email,
but the core network also relies on DNS mechanisms. The data
used for such mapping is stored in a tree-structured distributed
database, where the DNS hierarchical name space is partitioned
into zones authorized by different name servers.
Since DNS is heavily used by almost all Internet applica-
tions, analyzing its traffic has the potential to reveal anomalies
in the whole Internet traffic. Furthermore, DNS queries can be
easily captured by software and recorded in log files.
Security has become a crucial problem in the DNS. Thus,
it is an important task for DNS service providers to detect and
report anomalies as early as possible. Traditional methods in
1
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DNS security are rule-based methods: DNS experts have to
identify the characteristics or features of any anomalous behav-
ior from historical data oﬄine and then explicitly provide them
to the monitoring system in the form of rules. However, such
rule-based approach has two weaknesses:
1. patterns of abnormal behaviors are evolving dramatically
and rules are not easy to update;
2. the size of historical DNS dataset is beyond the ability of
human being to analyze.
Due to the hierarchical structure of DNS, top level domain
servers receive the most of DNS queries sent by clients, thus are
more appropriate as indicators of network anomalies. In this
work, several methods for anomaly detection in DNS traffic are
presented. The proposed algorithms can be divided in two main
categories:
• Cluster-based analysis
Cluster analysis first partitions a given DNS dataset into
separate groups, according to different rules and parame-
ters. Then it looks for items that do not belong to any of
the formed groups, which may indicate an anomaly.
• Histogram-based analysis
This study investigates how the amount of DNS queries
evolves in time and tries to find suspicious traffic spikes.
As shown in detail in next chapters, the two groups of studies
focus on different sets of query parameters. Effectiveness of the
proposed methods is tested on a real-world DNS log dataset,
2
which is captured at a country code top level domain server.
Such dataset contains almost 8 million queries and covers a
one-hour time interval.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 in-
troduces the Domain Name System (DNS) with its main compo-
nents and tasks. Chapter 3 describes the available DNS log files
and how they are used to reveal possible anomalies. Chapters
4 and 5 details three clustering algorithms for outlier detection
and the results of such algorithms. In Chapters 6 and 7 his-
togram analysis is presented, along with its results. Chapter 8
investigates the obtained results, both for cluster and histogram
analysis, and provides a comparison between the different ap-
proaches. Finally, Chapter 9 shows the conclusions of this work.
3

Chapter 2
Domain Name System
Any host connected to the Internet or a private network is
uniquely identified by its IP address. While perfectly suited for
processing by routers, fixed-length numeric addresses are not
easy for humans to memorize. For this reason a unique name
is also typically assigned to each host in a network. The In-
ternet has a particularly well-developed naming service to map
user-friendly host names into router-friendly IP addresses: the
Domain Name System (DNS).
2.1 DNS Hierarchy
Because of the large number of hosts connected to the net-
work, DNS employs a hierarchical name space (which means
that names are divisible into components) and the collection of
bindings that implements the translation is partitioned into dis-
joint sections and maintained in a distributed manner through-
out the Internet. DNS names are processed from right to left
5
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and use periods as the separator. The right-most label con-
veys the Top Level Domain (TLD); for example, the domain
name cicada.cs.princeton.edu belongs to the top level do-
main edu.
Like Unix file names, the DNS hierarchy can be visualized
as a tree, where each node corresponds to a domain and the
leaves correspond to the hosts being named. Figure 2.1 gives an
example of a domain name structure. Note that the hierarchy
is not very wide at the first level. There are domains for each
country, called country code top level domains (ccTLDs), plus
the "big six" TLDs, all based in the United States: edu, com,
gov, mil, org, and net.
Figure 2.1. DNS hierarchy partitioned into zones
The hierarchy is also partitioned into subtrees called DNS
zones. Each zone can be thought of as corresponding to some
administrative authority that is responsible for that portion
of the name space. For example, below the top level of the
hierarchy is a zone that corresponds to Princeton University.
Within this zone, some departments, like the Department of
Physics, do not want the responsibility of managing the name
space (and so they remain in the university-level zone), while
6
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others, like the Department of Computer Science, manage their
own department-level zone.
These informations are made available in name servers that
can be accessed over the network. Each name server, in turn, is
a program to which clients can send queries over the Internet.
Thus, from an implementation perspective, it is more accurate
to represent DNS by a hierarchy of name servers rather than by
a hierarchy of domains, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The top of
the hierarchy is served by the root name servers, the servers to
query when looking up (resolving) a TLD.
Figure 2.2. Hierarchy of name servers
Each zone is implemented in two or more name servers for
the sake of redundancy; that is, the service is still available
even if one name server fails. As explained in the next section,
7
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local caching is also employed to improve performance in the
resolution mechanism.
2.2 Name Resolution Mechanism
The client side of the DNS is called DNS resolver. A DNS re-
solver is responsible for initiating and sequencing the queries
that ultimately lead to a full resolution of the resource sought,
e.g., translation of a domain name into an IP address. Usually,
this resolution takes place transparently in Internet applications
such as web browsers and e-mail clients, so that users do not
need to communicate directly with a DNS resolver. What hap-
pens is that a user presents a host name to an application and
this application engages the DNS resolver to translate this name
into a host IP address. The application then uses the received
IP address to connect with the host.
As mention before, a name server is a specific implementa-
tion of a resolution mechanism that is available on the network
by sending it a message. The response to such a query can con-
tain either the final answer that the client wants, or a pointer
to another server that the client should query next. In fact, in
any system that has a distributed database, a particular server
may be presented with a query that can only be answered by
some other server.
To illustrate the basic idea, suppose the client wants to re-
solve the name cicada.cs.princeton.edu relative to the set
of servers shown in Figure 2.2. For proper operation, a network
host is configured with an initial cache of the known addresses of
the root name servers. Thus, the client first sends a query con-
taining this name to the edu root server. In typical operation,
8
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the root server does not provide the answer, but responds with
a referral to one or more authoritative servers for that domain
(in this case the princeton.edu name server) along with their
IP addresses. The client, having not received the answer it was
looking for, next sends the same query to the Princeton name
server at IP host 128.196.128.233. This server also can not
match the whole name, and so returns the cs.princeton.edu
name server. Finally, the client sends the same query as before
to the CS name server which returns 192.12.69.60, i.e., the IP
address of cicada.cs.princeton.edu it was looking for. The
whole iterative process is shown in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3. Example of address resolution
This mechanism would place a large traffic burden on the
root servers, if every resolution on the Internet would require
starting at the root. To off-load the root servers and improve ef-
ficiency in end-user applications, caching is used in local servers,
9
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which store DNS query results for a period of time (time-to-live)
determined in the configuration of the domain name record in
question. Caching these responses, the local server is sometimes
able to resolve future queries without having to go out over the
network. As a noteworthy consequence of this distributed and
caching architecture, changes to DNS records do not propagate
throughout the network immediately, but require the caches to
expire and refresh after the TTL.
2.2.1 Resource Records
As explained in the previous section, the zone information is
maintained by the name server as a collection of records, which
are called resource records (RRs). In essence, a resource record
is a name-to-value binding, or more specifically, a 5-tuple that
contains the following fields:
< Name, Value, Type, Class, TTL >
The Name and Value fields contain the data of the record, while
the Type field specifies how the these two entries should be
interpreted. For example, Type = A indicates that Value is the
IPv4 address of the host Name. The Class field identifies the
protocol family; to date, the only widely used Class is the one
used by the Internet (Class = IN). Finally, the TTL field shows
how long this resource record is valid: when time-to-live expires,
the server must delete the record from its cache.
Notice that DNS is not strictly used to map host names
into host addresses: it is more accurate to say that DNS maps
domain names into values. For example, in a name server record
(Type = NS) the Value field gives the authoritative name server
10
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that knows how to resolve names within the specified domain.
Table 2.1 is an overview of the most common resource records.
Type ID Description of the Value field
A 1 the IPv4 address of the host name
AAAA 28 the IPv6 address of the host name
CNAME 5 the canonical name of the host, where Name
is an alias of the host
MX 15 the domain name of a mail server
NS 2 the domain name of a name server
PTR 12 pointer to a domain name (reverse lookup)
TXT 16 machine-readable text strings
Table 2.1. Resource Records types
2.2.2 Reverse Lookup
Reverse DNS lookup (or reverse DNS resolution) is the determi-
nation of the domain name associated with an IP address. This
process is achieved via PTR queries to the .arpa TLD. This do-
main, which stands for Address and Routing Parameter Area,
contains two domains for reverse resolution: in-addr.arpa for
IPv4 addresses and ip6.arpa for IPv6 addresses. The intent
of these domain is to provide a guaranteed method to perform
host address to host name mapping.
In the in-addr.arpa domain, the four octets of an IPv4
address are concatenated in reverse order, used as name com-
ponents, and suffixed with .in-addr.arpa. To perform reverse
lookup, a PTR query is used to obtain the resource record with
11
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the name of the host. For example, a query for the host name
corresponding to IPv4 address 1.2.3.4 looks for PTR resource
records for 4.3.2.1.in-addr.arpa.
2.3 Queries and Response Codes
As already explained, DNS queries are messages which may be
sent to a name server to provoke a response. The name server
can either answer the question posed in the query, refer the
requester to another set of name servers, or signal some error
condition. Usually, users do not generate queries directly, but
makes a request to the resolver which in turn sends a query to
the name server and deals with the possible referrals.
Queries and responses are carried in a standard message
format, with a header and four sections that contain query pa-
rameters and resource records. The four sections are:
Question: 3-tuple of fields that describe the request, i.e., the
query domain name, the type of query and the query class
(as previously explained, usually set to IN).
Answer: a (possibly empty) list of RRs which directly answer
the query.
Authority: a (possibly empty) list of RRs which refer to other
authoritative servers.
Additional: a (possibly empty) list of RRs which relate to the
query, but are not strictly answers for the request.
The message header is a fixed-size set of fields that specify which
of the aforementioned sections are present and how many entries
12
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they consist of. Moreover, the header indicates if the message
is either a query or a response and, in the latter case, provides
the response code. This field, also called return code, shows the
status of the answer. For example, a return code set to NOERROR
means that the query worked properly and the client obtained
either the value it wanted or a referral to one or more name
servers it needs to query next. On the contrary, a NXDOMAIN
response code is used to inform the client that it is asking for
a non-existing domain. The most common response codes are
shown in Table 2.2.
Type ID Description
NOERROR 0 DNS query completed successfully
SERVFAIL 2 Server failed to complete the request
NXDOMAIN 3 Domain name does not exist
REFUSED 5 Server refused to answer for the query
Table 2.2. Response Codes
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Chapter 3
DNS Log Files
This works aims to find anomalies in DNS traffic at a top level
domain server. To do so, the study is conducted on one hour of
DNS query traffic at a ccTLD server. The queries in question
have been recorded on 09/04/2016, in the time interval from
22:00:00 GMT to 23:00:00 GMT and stored in log files.
In computing, a log file is a file that records the communica-
tions between a system and the users of that system, automat-
ically capturing the type, content and time of the transactions.
These files can be taken into account to understand the activ-
ity of complex systems and to diagnose problems, particularly
in the case of applications with little user interaction (such as
server applications).
The DNS query traffic investigated is stored in 798 separate
log files (with an index from 0 to 797). Each file is a plain
text document containing 10 000 queries, in chronological order,
that cover a slightly-variable time interval of about 3-5 seconds.
Besides the first three lines of header, each entry of the log files
15
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represents a query sent by a user, with its relative response.
Such an entry consist of the following fields:
When: Unix timestamp of the query
DNS_Client: IP address of the client sending the query
AS: Autonomous System number
ClientCountry: country code of the client sending the query
ClientCity: city of the client sending the query
DNS_Server: IP address of the server answering the query
Query: the searched domain
NumRetCode: ID of the return code (see Table 2.2)
RetCode: return code of the query
NumAnswer: number of answers provided by the server
NumQueryType: ID of the type of query (see Table 2.1)
QueryType: type of query
TransactionId: ID of the transaction
Answers: answers provided by the server
AuthNSs: authoritative name server for the domain searched
by the client
NumQueryPkts: number of packets of the query
NumReplyPkts: number of packets of the response
16
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ServerResponseTime(ms): time interval between the query
and the response, measured in milliseconds
RecordTTL: TTL the receiver must cache the responses (if
any)
3.1 Dictionaries of Queries
The first step for detecting anomalies in the log files taken into
account is to create a sort of dictionaries, which will be later
analyzed with the methods described in the following chapters.
Among the fields previously listed, five of them have been cho-
sen to initialize the entries of the dictionaries: DNS_Client,
ClientCountry, Query, RetCode and QueryType.
As far as the searched domains are concerned, only the sec-
ond level domain (SLD) is taken into account. For instance,
this means that a query for cicada.cs.princeton.edu and a
query for ee.princeton.edu are both understood as queries
for princeton.edu. In fact, in this work anomaly detection is
performed at the top of the domain name hierarchy, so the part
of the name beyond the second level is irrelevant to this type of
analysis. Moreover, if the entire names were taken into account,
the dictionaries would have too many entries for the analyses
conducted on the log files.
The dictionaries are divided in two groups: dictionaries for
cluster analysis (described in Chapter 4) and dictionaries for
histogram analysis (described in Chapter 6). Note that each
entry of a dictionary consists of several items, to which the
corresponding numerical values are assigned, as shown in the
next sections.
17
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3.1.1 Dictionaries for Cluster Analysis
Three dictionaries are created and used for the studies based
on cluster analysis:
1. Dictionary of domains:
This dictionary focus on the domains asked by the users.
Each of its entries describes a domain name, counting the
number of times it occurs in the log files.
The searched domain is associated with the informations
about the queries for that domain: the type of queries,
their response code and what country they come from.
Thus, an entry of the dictionary is structured as in the
following example:
example.cctld:
• Number of Queries: 252
• Query Types: ["A": 193, "AAAA": 55,
"NS": 3, "TXT": 1]
• RetCodes: ["NOERROR": 252]
• Countries: ["": 46, "FR": 12, "DE": 14,
"JP": 13, "HK": 4, "BR": 2, "FI": 1,
"RU": 20, "TR": 1, "LV": 1, "PA": 8,
"PE": 1, "PH": 4, "CN": 1, "CA": 2,
"IT": 27, "VN": 1, "AT": 2, "EU": 1,
"US": 70, "KR": 8, "UA": 10, "GB": 3]
2. Dictionary of IP clients:
In this case, queries are analyzed according to the IP ad-
dress of the users sending the queries. Each entry rep-
resents an IP client and, as for the previous dictionary,
18
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it consists of the corresponding informations about the
queries; a list of the domains searched by the user is also
saved, with a counter for each name. The resulting entry
is structured as follows:
130.207.54.157:
• Number of Queries: 2
• Countries: ["US": 2]
• Query Types: ["MX": 2]
• RetCodes: ["NOERROR": 1, "NXDOMAIN": 1]
• Queries: ["example1.cctld ": 1,
"example2.cctld ": 1]
3. Dictionary of IP networks (/24):
This dictionary has the same purpose and structure as
the previous dictionary. The only difference is that, in
this case, the IP addresses are not evaluated as separate
clients, but are aggregated according to the first 24 bits
of the IPv4 addresses, as shown in the example below:
103.22.241.x:
• Number of Queries: 4
• Countries: ["ID": 4]
• Query Types: ["AAAA": 2, "A": 2]
• RetCodes: ["NOERROR": 4]
• Queries: ["example.cctld ": 4]
IPv6 clients are not taken into account, since they occur
in a small amount of times.
19
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3.1.2 Dictionaries for Histogram Analysis
For the studies based on histogram analysis, the three dictio-
naries employed are:
1. Dictionary of countries:
This dictionary records the number of queries coming from
each country, based on the ClientCountry field in the log
files. Here is an example of the dictionary:
• AE: 4
• AL: 3
• AR: 33
• AT: 49
• AU: 30
• BA: 6
• BB: 1
• BE: 45
• BG: 10
...
• US: 3389
• UY: 3
• VE: 10
• VN: 5
• YE: 1
• ZA: 10
• ZM: 1
20
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2. Dictionary of query types:
In this dictionary, the QueryType field is used to classify
the DNS traffic, as in the example below:
• 35: 1
• 43: 10
• 52: 1
• A: 6037
• A6: 4
• AAAA: 2260
• ANY: 74
• CNAME: 7
• MX: 506
• NS: 157
• PTR: 529
• SOA: 32
• SPF: 9
• TXT: 179
3. Dictionary of response codes:
Finally, a dictionary is created according to response code
of the query. A typical case is as follows:
• NXDOMAIN: 408
• REFUSED: 8
• SERVFAIL: 508
• NOERROR: 8952
21
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3.2 Log Files and Time Bins
As previously explained, the DNS query traffic investigated in
this work consists of 798 separate log files, each of them covering
a time interval of a few seconds.
To perform analyses and detect potential anomalies, the
data need to be partitioned in time intervals, called time bins.
Doing so, it is possible to reveal suspicious patterns in the time
trend of the queries, which could indicate some malfunctioning
in the system or attack by a malicious user.
The partitioning of data into time bins is accomplished es-
tablishing a fixed number n_files, which defines how many log
files need to be aggregated to form a time bin. The dictionaries
are then created for each time bin.
Both clustering and histogram analyses are conducted with
two different values of n_files:
1. n_files = 1
Log files are not aggregated: each file constitutes a time
bin, resulting in 798 time bins of 3-5 seconds.
2. n_files = 21
Time bins are formed aggregating 21 consecutive log files,
resulting in 38 time bins of about one and a half minutes.
Appendix A shows the Python code used to create the de-
scribed dictionaries.
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Chapter 4
Clustering and Outlier
Detection
Cluster analysis, also called clustering, is a classification tech-
nique used to group a set of data objects into different groups,
without class label predefined. The general criterion for a good
clustering is that the data objects within a cluster are similar, or
closely related, to each other but are very dissimilar to, or dif-
ferent, from the objects in other clusters. This type of technique
has been used in many fields, including pattern recognition, sig-
nal processing and web mining.
4.1 Definitions
Clustering itself is not one specific algorithm, but the general
task to be solved that can be achieved by various methods which
differ significantly in their notion of membership to a cluster and
what constitutes a cluster.
23
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A first distinction between clustering algorithms can be made
according to the way an object belongs to one (or more) clusters:
Soft clustering: each data point can belong to more than one
cluster to a certain degree (grade of membership). This
type of clustering is also referred to as fuzzy clustering.
Hard clustering: each data point can only belong to exactly
one cluster, with no grade of membership.
Clustering algorithms can also be categorized based on their
cluster model; the main classes are:
Centroid-based clustering: In centroid-based clustering, clus-
ters are represented by a vector of centroids, which may
not necessarily be members of the dataset. The mostly
used centroid-based algorithm is k-means, where k is the
number of clusters chosen to partition all the observa-
tions in the dataset. Formally, the algorithm aims to find
k cluster centroids and assign the objects to the near-
est cluster centroid, such that the within-cluster sum of
squares (WCSS) are minimized:
argmin
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Si
‖ x− µi ‖2 (4.1)
wheres µi is the mean point in the partition Si.
Most k-means-type algorithms require the number of clus-
ters k to be specified in advance, which is considered to
be one of the biggest drawbacks of these algorithms. Fur-
thermore, the algorithms prefer clusters of approximately
similar size, as they will always assign an object to the
nearest centroid.
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Density-based clustering: In density-based clustering, clus-
ters are defined as areas of higher density than the re-
mainder of the dataset, where density is interpreted as
the number of objects in a neighborhood. High-density
regions, in fact, consist of a minimum number of points
within a certain radius. On the contrary, objects in low-
density areas can be labeled either as points at the bor-
der of a cluster or as points not belonging to any clus-
ter. The most popular density-based clustering method is
DBSCAN , which will be described in section 4.4.
4.2 DNS Queries and Outlier Detection
Cluster analysis can also be employed for outlier detection, where
the outliers are the data objects not falling in any cluster [6].
Outlier detection targets the finding of the rare data whose be-
havior is very exception compared with other data and it has
become a growingly useful tool in some applications such as
credit card fraud detection, pharmaceutical research, loan ap-
proval, intrusion detection and so on. In fact, in many fields
outliers are more important than the normal data, as they may
demonstrate either deviant behavior or the beginning of a new
pattern. Such an observation may be generated by a different
mechanism and cause damage to the user [7].
In this work, cluster analysis is used to detect anomalies in
the DNS log files described in Chapter 3, since outliers may
indicate fraudulent behavior, human error, or system damage.
However, in large dataset, a small number of outliers is to be
expected simply due to natural deviations in the dataset itself
and not due to any anomalous conditions.
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Three distinct cluster analyses are performed to detect out-
liers, according to three different parameters:
1. Number of queries per queried domain:
This analysis aims to find domain names that have been
queried an unusual number of times. In fact, if a name
server is asked for the same domain too many times, it
may indicate a malfunctioning in the resolution process.
2. Number of queries per IP client:
In this clustering study, IP addresses of the users are in-
vestigated. The purpose is to find possible clients that ask
an unusual amount of queries, which may indicate either
an attack or an erroneous behavior.
3. Number of queries per IP network (/24):
Following the principles of the previous analysis, this study
is performed aggregating the users belonging to the same
network, i.e., taking into account only the first 24 bits of
the IPv4 addresses of the clients.
4.3 Three-stage k-means
As previously explained, k-means is a distance-based partition-
ing algorithm that iteratively groups the data into k clusters.
The mean value of the data objects in each cluster, called cen-
troid, represents the cluster. The centroids are updated at each
iteration, until there is no change in them.
Despite being one of the most commonly-used methods, the
traditional k-means algorithm has some drawbacks: it is not
suitable for discovering clusters of different densities or sizes; it
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is sensitive to the choice of k (the number of the centroids) and,
most importantly, it does not have the notion of outliers, whose
detection is the goal of this study.
Partially following the work in [8], a three-stage k-means
algorithm has been developed.
Clusters are preliminarily determined at the first stage, early
clustering, with an iterative procedure on the cluster centroids.
When the early clustering converges, the centroids will finally
lie in their natural clusters and each data object is assigned to
each cluster with a certain grade of membership.
The second stage, late clustering, identifies the local outliers
and consequently removes their influence on the calculus of the
cluster centroids.
In the last stage, cluster merging, if there are enough data
objects shared by two or more clusters of similar densities, the
clusters are merged. When the merging converges, the proposed
algorithm finds the clusters (if any) that contain a number of
points smaller than a certain threshold; the data objects in such
cluster are then marked as outliers.
4.3.1 Early Clustering
The first stage of the algorithm is a derivation of the fuzzy clus-
tering, where each data point initially belongs to each cluster
to a certain grade of membership.
An integer k is chosen as the number of clusters and there-
fore the number of centroids. At the beginning, k points among
the n points of the dataset are randomly selected as the initial
centroids of the clusters, so that a cluster is univocally identified
by its centroid. The data point xi belongs to the cluster with
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centroid oj with a grade of membership calculated by using 4.2:
wij =
1
d(xi, oj)
k∑
j=1
1
d(xi, oj)
(4.2)
where the d(xi, oj) is the Euclidean distance between the data
point xi and cluster centroid oj .
At this point, a recursive procedure updates the centroids
at each iteration according to 4.3:
oj =
∑
i
wijxi∑
i
wij
s.t. wij ≥ αw · 1/k (4.3)
where the constraint wij ≥ αw · 1/k requires that only the data
points with membership grade no less than a certain thresh-
old should be considered when calculating the centroid of each
cluster. Note that 1/k is the average value for wij , being k the
number of clusters. Therefore wij > 1/k (αw = 1) means that
the data point xi belongs to the cluster, which is represented
by the centroid oj , with high possibility. To increase this possi-
bility and reduce the number of points involved in the calculus,
αw is set to 1,5.
If all the wij (i = 1, . . . , n), representing the degree of each
data point belonging to the cluster with the centroid oj , is less
than αw · 1/k, which means that oj is far away from all the
data points, the algorithm randomly selects a new centroid to
replace oj .
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The procedure stops when the centroids reach convergence
or after a maximum of iterations.
4.3.2 Late Clustering
When the early clustering converges, defuzzification is carried
out to transform the fuzzy membership to the hard membership
according to the following rules:
wij ≥ αw · 1/k ⇒ xi ∈ Cj (4.4a)
wij < αw · 1/k ⇒ xi /∈ Cj (4.4b)
where Cj is the cluster with the centroid oj . Note that, after the
defuzzification, the membership of a data point is not exclusive,
which means that a data point belonging to one cluster may also
belong to another cluster.
The centroids are then updated by using 4.5:
oj =
∑
i
xi
|Cj | xi ∈ Cj (4.5)
with |Cj | the number of points in the cluster Cj .
After the centroid update, a data point is identified as local
outlier if not belonging to any of the Cj (j = 1, . . . , k).
4.3.3 Clustering Merging
At this point, there are k centroids representing k clusters and
some of the k clusters may need to be merged. The principle
of cluster merging is that if two clusters are of similar density
and there are enough data objects belonging to both of them,
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they should be merged. The standard deviation values of the
clusters can be regarded as indicators of their densities:
σj =
√√√√√
∑
i
d(xi, oj)2
|Cj | − 1 (4.6)
where |Cj | is the number of points in Cj . The procedure iter-
atively takes two clusters at a time and test if they need to be
merged according to the following hypotheses:
2
3σj < σi <
3
2σj (4.7a)
|Ci ∩ Cj | = 18 max {|Ci|, |Cj |} (4.7b)
where 4.7a and 4.7b require the clusters, respectively, to be of
similar density and to share at least 1/8 fraction of their points.
Note that, after cluster merging, there still could be data
objects belonging to more than one cluster. Exclusive member-
ship is achieved by assigning each point to the closest cluster,
according to the Euclidean distance between the point and the
centroids of clusters it belongs to.
Finally, the algorithm checks how many data points are as-
signed to each centroid: if a cluster contains less than a mini-
mum number of pointsminPts, all the points in that cluster are
marked as global outliers. This is due to the fact that some ob-
servations could assume anomalous values similar to each other
and form a little cluster of abnormal points, which can not be
detected as the local outliers of late clustering. Thus, the al-
gorithm takes both local and global outliers as results of the
anomaly detection.
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4.3.4 Selecting Parameters
The proposed algorithm requires two parameters, k andminPts,
which must be specified beforehand. The initial number of clus-
ters k needs to be not too small, since cluster merging groups
clusters together. At the same time, higher values of k increase
the computational cost of the algorithm and do not add any
information as far as outlier detection is concerned. The follow-
ing values have been chosen for all three cluster analyses taken
into account:
1. k = 10
2. minPts = 5
Appendix B.1 shows the implementation of the algorithm in
a Python function.
4.4 DBSCAN
As mentioned in section 4.1, DBSCAN is a widely-used clus-
tering algorithm. The central component of this method is the
concept of core samples, which are objects lying in areas of high
density. A cluster is therefore a set of core samples, each close
to each other (measured by some distance function) and a set
of non-core samples, called border samples, that are close to a
core sample (but are not themselves core samples); intuitively,
these points are on the fringes of the cluster. Finally, non-core
samples that are not close to any core sample are called noise
samples and represent the outliers of the dataset.
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To determine which points are core samples and whether
two points are close or not, DBSCAN employs the density-
reachability model, a criterion defined by two thresholds:
1. minPts: the minimum number of objects in a neighbor-
hood for a point to be considered as a core point. This
value includes the point itself.
2. : the maximum distance between two objects for them
to be considered as density-connected, i.e., the radius of
the neighborhood.
Figure 4.1 shows the three possible cases a point can be labeled.
The red points, such as A, are core points, since the area sur-
Figure 4.1. DBSCAN example with minPts = 4
rounding these points in an  radius contains at least minPts
points (including the point itself). The yellow points B and C
do not have at leastminPts in their -radius neighborhood, but
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are reachable from a core point, thus belong to the cluster as
well and are labeled as border points. The point N is not a core
point and is not reachable from a core point, therefore is a noise
point and do not belong to any cluster.
The algorithm begins with an arbitrary starting point that
has not been visited. This point’s -neighborhood is retrieved:
if it contains at least minPts points (including itself), a cluster
is started, otherwise, the point is labeled as noise. If a point is
found to be a core point, its -neighborhood is also part of that
cluster and all points within this neighborhood are added to the
cluster. Then, the -neighborhoods of the newly added points
are also retrieved and the procedure continues recursively for
the new core points (if any) found this way. When all density-
connected points are added, the cluster is completely found.
Then, a new unvisited point is retrieved and processed, leading
to the discovery of a new cluster or a noise point.
Note that a non-core point x marked as noise might later
be found in the -neighborhood of a different core point and
hence be made part of a cluster, switching its status from noise
point to border point. If x has a distance lower than  from
two or more core points in different clusters, it is assigned to
whichever cluster is generated first, where the order is deter-
mined randomly. This means that DBSCAN is not determin-
istic as far as border points are concerned, depending on the
order the dataset is processed. This situation does not arise
often and has little impact on the clustering results. DBSCAN
is instead deterministic both on core points and noise points,
making the results relatively stable between runs on the same
data.
The main advantages of DBSCAN are that it does not need
the number of clusters a priori and that it can form clusters of
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an arbitrary shape, in contrast to most centroid-based methods,
which require the number of clusters and tend to find clusters of
approximately the same size. On the other hand, the algorithm
assumes clusters of similar density and may have some problems
separating nearby clusters. Another drawback is that it expects
some kind of density drop to detect cluster borders.
4.4.1 Selecting Parameters
DBSCAN requires two parameters,  and minPts, which must
be specified by the user. These two parameters define formally
whether a point belongs to a high-density area or not. Higher
minPts and lower  indicate higher density necessary to form a
cluster, which results in more clusters and more points labeled
as outliers. On the contrary, with lower values of minPts and
higher values of , clusters will merge and the majority of objects
will be in the same cluster; at the same time, fewer points will be
marked as outliers. As far as the metric function is concerned,
the Euclidean distance is the most common choice and is the
one used in these cluster analyses.
Table 4.1 summarizes the parameters chosen for the different
studies, both for n_files = 1 and n_files = 21.
Cluster Analysis  minPts
Number of queries per domain 5.8 4
Number of queries per IP client 4.2 4
Number of queries per IP client (/24) 4.9 3
Table 4.1. DBSCAN parameters
The Python code for DBSCAN is shown in Appendix B.2.
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4.5 Outlier Factor Algorithm
The third method consists of two separate stages: the first stage
employs a clustering algorithm to partition the dataset into clus-
ters, whereas the second stage marks each gained cluster either
as normal or as outlier.
The procedure to form clusters is described as follows:
1. Initialize the first cluster with the first object of the dataset.
2. If no objects are left in the dataset STOP, otherwise read
a new object p.
3. Find the cluster C∗ in S that is closest to the object p,
i.e., C∗ such that d(p, C∗) ≤ d(p, Cj) for all Cj in S.
4. If d(p, C∗) > r, create a new cluster with the object p,
otherwise merge p into the cluster C∗ and update the
cluster centroid.
5. Go to step 2.
where d(p, C∗) is the Euclidean distance between the point p
and the centroid of C∗, which is computed as the arithmetic
mean of the points belonging to C∗. Instead, r is a distance
threshold that must be set by the user.
The second stage determines outlier clusters computing the
outlier factor of each cluster, which is defined as follows:
OF (Ci) =
∑
j /=i
|Cj | · d(Ci, Cj) (4.8)
where |Cj | is the number of points in Cj .
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The k clusters obtained in the first stage are then sorted
according to their outlier factor, in a decreasing order:Clusters = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck}
OF (C1) ≥ OF (C2) ≥ · · · ≥ OF (Ck)
(4.9)
Once the clusters are sorted, the algorithm finds the minimum
b which satisfies:
b∑
i=1
|Ci|
|D| ≥  0 <  < 1 (4.10)
where |D| is the number of objects in the dataset. Finally, the
method labels all points in clusters C1, C2, . . . , Cb−1 as outliers
and all points in clusters Cb, Cb+1, . . . , Ck as normal points.
4.5.1 Selecting Parameters
The proposed algorithm requires two parameters: r for the first
stage and  for the second stage. Threshold r is chosen using
the following sampling technique:
1. Choose randomly N0 = 100 pairs of objects in the dataset.
2. Compute the distances between each pair of objects.
3. Compute the average µ of distances from step 2.
4. Select r in the range [0.7µ, 0.9µ].
The value  is an approximate ratio of the number of outliers to
the whole dataset. Since no information about the amount of
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anomalies is available, several trials are performed to estimate
the appropriate value for . Table 4.2 summarizes the values of
 in the different scenarios.
n_files = 1 n_files = 21
Number of queries  = 0.0005  = 0.00005
per domain
Number of queries  = 0.0005  = 0.0001
per IP client
Number of queries  = 0.0007  = 0.0002
per IP client (/24)
Table 4.2. OF Algorithm parameters
Appendix B.3 shows the Python code used to implement the
described algorithm.
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Chapter 5
Clustering Results
The previous chapter described three clustering algorithm for
outlier detection and explained how such algorithms are used
to study DNS query traffic. Three cluster analysis, based on
searched domains, IP clients and IP networks, are performed
both with a single-file time bin and a 21-file time bin on all 798
log files. As far as single-file study is concerned, the following
sections show the obtained results for the 21 separate files that
constitute the 34th aggregated time bin.
In each study, the proposed methods reveal the same anoma-
lies and the same false positives, only differing in the number
of times such detections occur throughout all time bins.
5.1 Clustering of Domains
Clustering the number of queries per searched domain aims to
find domain names which are asked for a suspicious amount of
times. This study is not likely to detect attacks, since malicious
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users usually do not simply repeat the same queries but rather
ask the DNS for several different addresses; however, it may
reveal some malfunctioning in the system. Figure 5.1 illustrates
an example of this analysis employing three-stage k-means: as
shown, each cluster is assigned a different color and black points
represent the resulting outliers.
Figure 5.1. Example of domain clustering with three-
stage k-means
This analysis leads to the detection of only one anomaly,
both in single-file and aggregated case: the in-addr.arpa do-
main. Such domain, as explained in 2.2.2, is responsible for
reverse DNS resolution. In most time bins, all three algorithms
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find a great number of this type of requests: the great majority
of such queries are sent from a few ISPs and hosting compa-
nies from Iran and USA. All these PTR queries try to complete
the reverse lookup for IP addresses belonging to the same net-
work: since the reverse lookup did not complete successfully, the
senders of such queries repeat the exact same request multiple
times, always leading to a SERVFAIL response code.
As far as false alarms are concerned, clustering the number
of queries per search domain generate from 1 to 9 false positives
per time bin, all relative to regular queries asking for domain
names of ISPs or hosting companies.
Detections False positives
Three-stage k-means 12 107
DBSCAN 11 68
OF algorithm 8 19
Table 5.1. Single-file analysis: detections and false alarms
Detections False positives
Three-stage k-means 20 142
DBSCAN 26 265
OF algorithm 15 129
Table 5.2. Multiple-file analysis: detections and false alarms
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the results of this study, respectively
in single-file and aggregated analysis.
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5.2 Clustering of IP clients
This study focuses on the senders of the DNS queries. An ex-
ample of clustering the number of queries per IP client is shown
in Figure 5.2, where DBSCAN uses a bigger point to represent
core points.
Figure 5.2. Example of client clustering with DBSCAN
Contrary to the previous analysis, studying the number of
queries per IP client can lead to the discovery of attacks and
malicious behavior by such users. Moreover, as shown below,
this procedure generates a smaller amount of false alarms and
detects different anomalies.
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These are the anomalies found in the 34th aggregated time
bin with a single-file analysis:
1. 46.4.10.130
This IP address belongs to the German Internet hosting
company Hetzner. All log-file entries featuring this ad-
dress represent NULL queries it sends to resolve domain
names in alphabetic order. As explained in [4], NULL is an
experimental query type and it is usually avoided.
This anomaly is revealed by all three clustering algorithm
in 16 out of 21 time bins.
2. 2a03:1780:1:17::188
The whole amount of traffic produced by this user consists
of NS queries for non-exiting domains. Such domains seem
to be generated automatically and follow an alphabetic
order, leading to a response code set to NXDOMAIN.
This anomaly is revealed
– 7 times by three-stage k-means
– 3 times by DBSCAN
– 2 times by outlier factor algorithm
3. 2.188.21.2, 217.66.199.20
These addresses belong to two separate Iranian telecom-
munications companies: Telecommunication Infrastruc-
ture Company and FANAP Telecom. Such IP addresses
are responsible for the PTR queries of the in-addr.arpa
anomaly described in section 5.1. As previously explained,
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these repeated queries represent a failed attempt to per-
form reverse lookup.
This anomaly is revealed
– 9 times by three-stage k-means
– 8 times by DBSCAN
– 2 times by outlier factor algorithm
In this analysis, a few false alarms are generated: three-stage
k-means and DBSCAN find from 1 to 3 false alarms in each
time bin, while outlier factor algorithm generates 1 false alarm
at most per time bin.
Performing this cluster analysis with a 21-file time bin on
all log files allows to find the aforementioned irregularities and
the following anomalies:
1. 130.207.54.141
This attack involves an IP client from USA sending a great
amount of queries. All searched domain names begin with
a fixed string followed by random words.
This anomaly is revealed
– 2 times by three-stage k-means
– 6 times by DBSCAN
– 5 times by outlier factor algorithm
2. 176.74.192.219
One IP address belonging to a hosting company, Swedish
Tralex AB, generates an abnormal amount traffic, reach-
ing 15 000 NS queries per time bin. Such queries ask for
different domain names in alphabetic order.
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This anomaly is revealed for the first time in the 30th time
bin and is detected in all the following time bins by each
clustering algorithm.
As far as false alarms are concerned, the three algorithms pro-
vide performances similar to the single-file case, with a slightly
higher number of false positives in a few time bins.
5.3 Clustering of IP clients /24
Finally, a second cluster analysis on the users sending the queries
is performed. In this case, IP clients are gathered according to
the first 24 bits of their IPv4 addresses. Figure 5.3 illustrates
an example of clustering the number of queries per IP network
employing outlier factor algorithm.
The basic idea of this study is that some malfunctioning or
malicious behavior may be distributed across clients belonging
to the same network, making such anomalies non-detectable by
single-address study. A comparison between the two approaches
leads to the following results:
• The main anomalies discovered by the previous cluster
analysis, i.e., those generated by
– 46.4.10.130
– 176.74.192.219,
are detected as 46.4.10.x and 176.74.192.x respectively.
As in single-address case, such anomalies are found in the
first time bin of their occurrence and in all the following
time bins by each clustering algorithm.
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Figure 5.3. Example of network clustering with OF algorithm
• Network clustering on all log files with an aggregated time
bin reveals 130.207.54.x in all 38 time bins. As seen in
the single-address analysis, 130.207.54.141 is responsi-
ble for an attack to the DNS. Thus, grouping IP addresses
according to their first 24 bits increases the number of de-
tections of such anomaly. At the same time, an investiga-
tion on queries sent by other users belonging to the same
network shows that only the aforementioned IP address
generates malicious traffic, which entails a higher number
of false alarms.
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• Anomalies linked to the failed reverse lookup are revealed
in only two single-file time bins. This lower level of detec-
tion is due to the fact that only one address per network
sends those queries and that the resulting traffic occurs at
bursts in short time intervals.
• In four aggregated time bins (from 25th to 28th), network
clustering detects a previously-unseen anomaly: addresses
belonging to German network 208.69.33.x generate an
abnormal amount of traffic, exceeding 15 000 queries per
time bin.
In general, network clustering provide performances similar to
client clustering in terms of detected anomalies, with a slightly
higher number of false alarms in the case of 21-file time bin.
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Chapter 6
Histograms and Traffic
Spikes
In this analysis, histograms are employed and compared to de-
tect possible anomalies. A histogram is a representation of the
probability distribution of a numerical variable: in this case,
the number of queries.
The first step is to divide the entire dataset into a series
of non-overlapping bins and then count how many values fall
into each bin. Such a bin can either be a range of values or a
category; the latter type of histogram is also referred to as bar
chart. A bar chart is a graph that uses bars to show comparisons
among categories: one axis of the chart specifies the categories
being compared, while the other axis represents the number of
points belonging to that category. Thus, a histogram represents
a frequency distribution by means of rectangular bars whose
widths represent class bins and whose heights are proportional
to the to the number of observations falling in that bin.
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6.1 Histograms of Queries
Using the built dictionaries of queries (see section 3.1.2), his-
tograms of the number of queries are computed for each time
bin, both in single-file and aggregated analysis, according to
three parameters: type of query, response code and country.
6.1.1 Histograms by Query Types
Figure 6.1 shows the typical DNS traffic behavior as far as query
types are concerned. As expected, the great majority of queries
Figure 6.1. Histogram of queries by query type
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are sent to obtain the IPv4 or IPv6 address of a domain name,
respectively with A and AAAA query types.
6.1.2 Histograms by Response Code
As already explained, the response code indicates the status of
the query, i.e., the type of answer the name server sends back
to the client. If the response code is set to NOERROR, it means
Figure 6.2. Histogram of queries by response code
that the query completed successfully, with the client obtaining
either the value it wanted or a name server to query next. The
typical pattern for response codes in shown in Figure 6.2.
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6.1.3 Histograms by Countries
An example of histograms by countries is shown in Figure 6.3.
As expected, DNS queries come from a high number of different
countries and histograms prove to be more homogeneous than
in the previously-described cases.
Figure 6.3. Histogram of queries by country
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6.1.4 Two-field Histograms
The last histogram analysis aims to classify DNS traffic using
the informations given by response codes and countries at the
same time. To do so, only NXDOMAIN and SERVFAIL queries are
taken into account, since they are the ones which could indicate
possible anomalies. Such queries are then grouped by country
as in the previous section.
Figure 6.4. Histogram of NXDOMAIN queries by country
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show, respectively, the histogram of
NXDOMAIN queries by country and the histogram of SERVFAIL
queries by country.
53
6 – Histograms and Traffic Spikes
Figure 6.5. Histogram of SERVFAIL queries by country
6.2 Difference Between Histograms
As already mentioned, the described histograms are computed
for each time bin, both in single-file and aggregated case. The
aim of this analysis is to study the evolution of these histograms
in time and find anomalous changes in the volume of traffic. In
fact, a sudden increase (spike) of the number of queries falling in
a specific category (for instance, queries asking for non-existing
domains) may indicate erroneous or malicious behavior.
Starting from a reference time bin T ∗, in which no anoma-
lous pattern is present, histograms relative to the next time bin
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are compared to the reference histograms. The procedure first
computes the difference between values for each field, i.e., for
each country, query type and so on. These differences are then
used to investigate suspicious increases in each category.
The proposed method reveals a spike if the increase of the
value is greater or equal than a certain minimum. The idea
is that an increase needs to be relevant both from an absolute
and and a relative point of view for being detected as a spike.
Thus, this condition is defined by two thresholds: ξabs and ξrel.
A formal explanation of the procedure is given by the following
equations:
x(tn)− x∗(tn−1) ≥ ξabs (6.1a)
x(tn)− x∗(tn−1)
x∗(tn−1)
≥ ξrel (6.1b)
where x∗(tn−1) is the value of the reference histogram of the
category x for the time bin n− 1. If this twofold hypothesis is
verified, the procedure reveals a spike of x (for instance, AAAA
queries) in the nth time bin.
Once all histograms at time tn are investigated, the reference
histograms need to be updated for the next comparison at time
tn+1. In each analysis, for instance the study of queries by coun-
tries, its reference histogram consists of the last non-anomalous
values in each category. Formally, given a histogram H(tn) and
its reference histogram H∗(tn−1), where
• H(tn) = [x0(tn), x1(tn), . . . ]
• H∗(tn−1) = [x∗0(tn−1), x∗1(tn−1), . . . ],
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the next reference histogram H∗(tn) = [x∗0(tn), x∗1(tn), . . . ] is
built such that:
x∗i (tn) =
x
∗
i (tn−1) if xi(tn) represents a spike
xi(tn) otherwise
(6.2)
To determine the most appropriate value for ξabs and ξrel, it
is necessary to study how these thresholds influence two funda-
mental parameters: detection rate (DR) and false positive rate
(FPR).
The detection rate measures the probability of properly re-
vealing an anomaly and is defined as:
DR = true positives
N1
(6.3)
where N1 is the total number of anomalous queries. In a sim-
ilar manner, the false positive rate refers to the probability of
generating false alarms; therefore FPR is defined as:
FPR = false positives
N2
(6.4)
where N2 is the total number of non-anomalous queries.
To calculate these two parameters, it is necessary to know
the number of anomalies N1 a-priori, while the number of non-
anomalous queries can be easily obtained as N2 = N − N1,
where N is the total number of queries. Thus, an exhaustive
study of one or more DNS log files is needed to determine DR
and FPR, as explained in the next chapter.
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Histogram Results
This chapter first shows the results of an exhaustive study per-
formed on four DNS log files. Such results are then used to
analyze how DR and FPR evolve as ξabs and ξrel change in each
histogram analysis. Detection rate and false positive rate are
investigated by using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curves, which determine the best value for ξabs and ξrel: these
threshold values are then used to perform histogram analysis
with single-file time bins on all available log files. Finally, dif-
ference between histograms is carried out also with aggregated
time bins.
7.1 Exhaustive Study of Log Files
To calculate DR and FPR for certain values of ξabs and ξrel, and
consequently determine the best values for the aforementioned
thresholds, it is necessary to perform an exhaustive study of
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a sample of the DNS traffic taken into account in this analy-
sis. Four log files, belonging to the 34th aggregated time bin,
have been investigated. These are the anomalies found in each
examined file:
1. Distributed attack - SE #1
Several IP addresses, belonging to different networks, ask
for non-existing domains. Such domains seem to be au-
tomatically generated since they all start with the string
"ipa". Each IP client only asks for one or two domains,
for a total of about 30 queries in each investigated file.
All queries are name server queries and receive NXDOMAIN
as response code. As far as country codes are concerned,
almost all queries are sent from Sweden (SE).
2. Distributed attack - SE #2
As in the previous attack, many IP addresses from Swe-
den generate NS queries for non-existing domains. Such
domains are searched in alphabetic order and all start
with the string "jean".
3. Distributed attack - FR
French (FR) IP clients generate NS queries for non-existing
domains starting with the string "noah". In this case,
each IP client sends more queries (from 10 to 90 different
domains), for a total of about 150 queries per log file.
4. Distributed attack - CN
IP clients belonging to two separate Chinese networks ask
for non-existing domains containing (not necessarily at
the beginning) the string "8j11". Contrary to the previous
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attacks, the query type is A, not NS. Each log file contains
about 30 queries of this type, which all return NXDOMAIN.
5. in-addr.arpa - IR, US
A couple of ISPs from Iran and USA fail to complete the
reverse lookup for IPv4 addresses belonging to a specific
network: the same PTR queries are repeated many times
and always receive SERVFAIL as response code.
6. Hetzner - DE (46.4.10.130)
One IP address of the German Internet hosting company
Hetzner occurs about 700 times in each log file. All queries
sent by this address are type 0 (NULL) queries that ask
for domain names in alphabetic order. According to [4],
NULL resource records are used as placeholders in some ex-
perimental extensions of the DNS and are usually avoided.
Almost every searched names is an existing domain, which
leads to a response code set to NOERROR.
7. Tralex AB - SE (176.74.192.219)
Similarly to the previous anomaly, one IP address of a
hosting company, Swedish Tralex AB, generates an un-
usual amount of traffic: more than 800 NS queries per
log file. Following an alphabetic order, such queries ask
for different domain names, whereof about 25% are non-
existing domains.
8. Single-user attack - CA (207.102.138.158)
A single IP client from Canada appears to send about 20
A queries in each log file investigated. Similarly to the
distributed attacks previously described, all queries ask
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for non-existing domains that start with the same string
(in this case "all").
9. Single-user attack - US (67.228.50.178)
Finally, a client from USA generates about 40 NS queries
per log file. Such queries ask for non-existing domains
names containing (not necessarily at the beginning) the
string "einstein" and all lead to a NXDOMAIN response code.
Among the 40 000 queries of the four examined log files, 5 166
are associated to the described anomalies, while the remainder
34 834 are considered regular queries. Using these informations,
DR and FPR are computed for several values of ξabs and ξrel.
Such DRs and FPRs are then studied to determine the most
appropriate thresholds in each histogram analysis, as shown in
the next section.
7.2 ROC Curves
ROC curves are graphical plots that illustrate the performance
of a binary classifier system as its discrimination thresholds are
varied. Such a curve is created by plotting the detection rate in
the y-axis against the false positive rate in the x-axis at various
threshold settings. Any ROC curve has two extreme points:
(0,0), which indicates that no detection is made, and (1,1),
in which case all entry of the file are considered as anomalous.
Best performances occur when the curve is close to the point
(0,1), which corresponds to the ideal case of 0% false alarms
and 100% correct detections.
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7.2.1 ROC Curve for Query Types
Figure 7.1 shows the ROC curve for the difference between his-
tograms of query types. With ξrel = 10% and ξabs = 200 the
algorithm generates 4 064 true positives and 9 318 false posi-
tives. Therefore, such thresholds lead to the following detection
rate and false positive rate:
• DR = 78,66%
• FPR = 23,75%
Figure 7.1. ROC curve for query types
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7.2.2 ROC Curve for Response Codes
The ROC curve for histograms of response codes is shown in
Figure 7.2. In this case, two couples of thresholds, (ξrel = 5%,
ξabs = 50) and (ξrel = 10%, ξabs = 100), lead to 2 117 true
positives and 2 766 false positives, corresponding to:
• DR = 40,97%
• FPR = 7,94%
Figure 7.2. ROC curve for response codes
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7.2.3 ROC Curve for Countries
As illustrated in Figure 7.3, ξrel = 10% and ξabs = 250 lead
to the best performances as far as histograms of countries are
concerned. Such thresholds generate 4 651 true positives and
4 165 false positives, corresponding to:
• DR = 80,62%
• FPR = 11,95%
Figure 7.3. ROC curve for countries
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7.2.4 ROC Curve for Countries (NXDOMAIN)
As previously explained, country analysis is performed also fil-
tering the whole set of queries according to two response codes:
NXDOMAIN and SERVFAIL. For NXDOMAIN queries, the best per-
formances are obtained with ξrel = 5% and ξabs = 30.
Figure 7.4. ROC curve for countries (NXDOMAIN queries)
Such thresholds generate 1 299 true positives and 872 false
positives, which lead to:
• DR = 25,14%
• FPR = 2,50%
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7.2.5 ROC Curve for Countries (SERVFAIL)
As far as SERVFAIL queries are concerned, the detection rate is
always low, since most of the aforementioned anomalies do not
involve this response code. With ξrel = 3% and ξabs = 15 the
algorithm generates 658 true positives and 20 false positives,
corresponding to:
• DR = 12,74%
• FPR = 0,06%
Figure 7.5. ROC curve for countries (SERVFAIL queries)
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7.3 Single-file Time Bin
As previously explained, difference between histograms is used
to find spikes in the DNS query traffic; such spikes are detected
employing two thresholds: ξrel and ξabs. ROC curves are used to
determine the best values for the two thresholds when analyzing
the four investigated log files. Table 7.1 summarizes the chosen
thresholds.
Analysis relative threshold absolute threshold
by Query Type ξrel = 10% ξabs = 200
by Response Code ξrel = 5% ξabs = 50
by Country ξrel = 10% ξabs = 250
by Country (NX) ξrel = 5% ξabs = 30
by Country (SF) ξrel = 3% ξabs = 15
Table 7.1. Thresholds for single-file histogram analysis
In terms of detection rate and false positive rate, such thresh-
olds lead to the results shown in Table 7.2.
Analysis detection rate false positive rate
by Query Type DR = 78,66% FPR = 23,75%
by Response Code DR = 40,97% FPR = 7,94%
by Country DR = 80,62% FPR = 11,95%
by Country (NX) DR = 25,14% FPR = 2,50%
by Country (SF) DR = 12,74% FPR = 0,06%
Table 7.2. DR and FPR for single-file histogram analysis
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These data represent the ground truth of the proposed al-
gorithm. Histogram analysis with single-file time bins is then
performed on all 798 log files, leading to the following results:
1. Spikes in histograms by query type
This analysis reveals 745 spikes in the DNS log files. The
great majority of these detections are linked to the anoma-
lies described in section 7.1, which consist of NS, NULL and
PTR queries.
2. Spikes in histograms by response code
In this case, the algorithm reveals 963 spikes, whereof 781
NXDOMAIN, 179 SERVFAIL, 2 NOERROR and 1 REFUSED.
3. Spikes in histograms by country
Histogram analysis by countries reveals 890 spikes. Most
of these likely anomalies come from Germany, Iran, Swe-
den and USA.
4. Spikes in histograms by country (NXDOMAIN)
Performing analysis by country on only the queries that
return NXDOMAIN, 1857 spikes are detected.
5. Spikes in histograms by country (SERVFAIL)
In case of SERVFAIL queries analysis, 425 spikes are re-
vealed, whose great majority is linked to the reverse lookup
anomaly from Iran and USA.
Based on the ground truth given by the exhaustive study
previously described, these analyses on all log files are supposed
to lead to the same levels of detection rate and false positive
rate, as shown in Table 7.2.
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7.4 Multiple-file Time Bin
As previously mentioned, difference between histograms is also
performed with a multiple-file time bin. The whole set of 798
log files is partitioned into 38 time bins, each consisting of 21
consecutive files.
The values chosen for ξrel and ξabs in single-file analysis are
not appropriate for time bins with 210 000 queries (instead of
10 000). For this reason, the various ξabs are set to their respec-
tive value in single-file analysis multiplied by 21, whereas ξrel
can be left as inferred by the ROC curves. Table 7.3 shows the
chosen thresholds in the case of 21-file time bins.
Analysis relative threshold absolute threshold
by Query Type ξrel = 10% ξabs = 4200
by Response Code ξrel = 5% ξabs = 1050
by Country ξrel = 10% ξabs = 5250
by Country (NX) ξrel = 5% ξabs = 630
by Country (SF) ξrel = 3% ξabs = 315
Table 7.3. Thresholds for multiple-file histogram analysis
Histogram analysis with aggregated time bins leads to the
following results:
1. Spikes in histograms by query type
Studying histograms by query type, 34 spikes are revealed.
Almost all detections show a sudden increase of NS and
NULL queries, which begin in the 17th time bin and con-
tinue up to the end.
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2. Spikes in histograms by response code
In this case, the algorithm reveals 52 spikes, whereof 37
NXDOMAIN and 15 SERVFAIL.
3. Spikes in histograms by country
Histogram analysis by countries reveals 25 spikes, mostly
from Germany and Sweden.
4. Spikes in histograms by country (NXDOMAIN)
Taking into account only the queries that return NXDOMAIN,
histogram analysis by countries detects 71 spikes.
5. Spikes in histograms by country (SERVFAIL)
As far as SERVFAIL queries are concerned, histograms by
country lead to the detection of 27 spikes. As in the single-
file analysis, the great majority of such spikes is related
to the reverse lookup anomaly from Iran and USA.
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Chapter 8
Result Discussion
This chapter aims to gather the results obtained by both cluster
and histogram analysis and to to give an exhaustive comparison
between different approaches.
8.1 Cluster Analysis
In clustering of IP clients, the three proposed algorithms re-
vealed 3 anomalies in the single-file analysis performed on the
34th aggregated time bin and 5 anomalies in the analysis on all
log files with a 21-file time bin. In this cluster analysis, three-
stage k-means and DBSCAN detected such anomalies with a
similar rate, generating basically the same amount of false posi-
tives, linked to IP addresses of ISPs or host companies. Instead,
the outlier factor algorithm revealed the anomalies in fewer time
bins, but provided a remarkable drop in the number of false pos-
itives.
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Aggregating IP clients according to the first 24 bits of their
addresses (network clustering) allowed anomaly detection sim-
ilarly to the previous cluster analysis, with a few differences.
Network clustering was able to detect all anomalies revealed by
the previous analysis, plus one anomaly never detected in client
clustering. One the other hand, grouping separate IP clients
into a single entry led to a slightly higher number of false posi-
tive, especially with a 21-file time bin.
Clustering of domains proved to be the least efficient method,
since it is able to detect only one anomaly, in-addr.arpa, and
generates the higher number of false positives. As in the pre-
vious analyses, three-stage k-means and DBSCAN gave similar
results, whereas the outlier factor algorithm led to lower number
of detections and false positives.
8.2 Histogram Analysis
As previously shown in Table 7.2, histogram analysis by coun-
try proved to be the most efficient, with a 80,62% detection rate
and a 11,95% false positive rate. This is due to the fact that,
when an anomalous pattern occurs, almost all queries relative
to that anomaly come from the same country, usually allowing
the detection of a traffic spike for that particular country. Note
that such detection is achieved regardless of other query param-
eters, such as response code or query type. Moreover, countries
responsible for the greatest portion of the anomalies (which are
Germany, Iran and Sweden) generate a little amount of regular
queries, entailing an easier spike detection and a low number of
false alarms.
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Good performances are obtained also with a histogram anal-
ysis by query type, which led to a detection rate of 78,66% and
a false positive rate of 23,75%. An interesting feature emerged
by this analysis is that the great majority of anomalous traffic is
linked to three query types: NULL (which is regularly avoided),
NS and PTR (which both usually constitute a small portion of the
traffic). The number of false alarms increases when detecting
a spike linked to anomalies employing a more common type of
query, such as A or AAAA. See Figure 6.1 for a regular query-type
scenario.
Histogram analysis by response code led to much worse per-
formances, with a 40,97% detection rate and a 7,94% false pos-
itive rate. User attacks usually involve queries for non-existing
domains, which lead to a NXDOMAIN response code. While such
attacks are easily detectable with this study, anomalies linked
to an ISP or host company malfunctioning may generate a great
amount of queries that complete successfully, i.e., returning a
NOERROR response code. Therefore, such amount of traffic is not
detectable by response code analysis, regardless of the chosen
thresholds.
For the same reason, performing a country analysis filtering
queries according to suspicious response codes (both NXDOMAIN
and SERVFAIL) led to poor results. In fact, taking into account
only NXDOMAIN queries the maximum detection rate achievable
is 25,14%. As far as SERVFAIL queries are concerned, country
analysis is able to reach only a 12,74% detection rate, since only
one anomaly is linked to this response code. At the same time,
both NXDOMAIN and SERVFAIL analyses led to low false positive
rates, respectively 2,50% and 0,06%.
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8.3 Different Approach Comparison
In general, histogram analysis proved to be more efficient than
cluster analysis, since it was able to detect more anomalies along
with rather low levels of false alarms.
The two anomalies linked to a single IP address belonging
to a hosting company (see sections 5.2 and 7.1) are detected in
the first time bin they occur and in most of the following time
bins, both by client and network clustering. Such anomalies are
revealed with the same rate by histogram analyses of countries
and query types, whereas not detected at all by the other his-
togram analyses: in fact, excluding all NOERROR queries from the
study prevents the detection of the aforementioned anomalies.
The anomaly linked to the failed reverse lookup is detected
in a similar way by all cluster and histogram analyses, with the
exception of histograms by country of NXDOMAIN queries since
such queries always return SERVFAIL.
Client clustering reveals an attack performed by a single IP
address, which acutally belongs to the distributed attack from
France emerged in the exhaustive study of log files. Histogram
analysis detects a spike for such anomaly in the studies of query
types (since query type is always NS) and NXDOMAIN queries per
country (since all IP clients ask for non-existing domains). No
other analysis (either cluster- or histogram-based) reveals this
attack.
Finally, the anomalous traffic generated by 130.207.54.141
is detected in a few aggregated time bins by client clustering and
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NXDOMAIN histogram analysis per country. As mentioned in sec-
tion 8.1, network clustering correctly reveals such anomaly in
more time bins, but at the same time generates the false alarms
linked to the non-malicious users belonging to the same net-
work.
As far as the time-bin dimension is concerned, aggregating
files in a larger time bin led to a little increase of correct detec-
tions in cluster analysis, along with a slightly higher number of
false alarms. Instead, in histogram analysis, no particular dif-
ference emerged between studies performed with single-file time
bins and 21-files time bins.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a fundamental Internet
infrastructure, which is relied on by many Internet applications.
Security and anomaly detection is a crucial problem in the DNS,
especially at the top of the domain name hierarchy.
The proposed methods are used to investigate a real-world
dataset, which consists of one hour of DNS query traffic. Such
data are captured at a country code top level domain and stored
in 798 separate log files.
Three clustering algorithm for outlier detection have been
shown to reveal possible anomalies in DNS query traffic. Such
algorithms have been used to investigate the number of queries
according to three parameters:
1. Searched domain
2. IP client
3. IP network
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Then, histogram analysis is employed to detect suspicious spikes
in the DNS traffic. In order to reveal traffic spikes, the method
first builds histograms for each time bin and then computes the
difference between such histograms. Histograms have been used
to measure the number of queries by the following parameters:
1. Country
2. Query type
3. Response code
Both cluster and histogram analysis have been performed with
a single-file time bin and a 21-file time bin.
The algorithms shown in this work have been able to detect
several kinds of anomalies in the investigated log files:
• IP clients that fail to perform reverse lookup for a particu-
lar set of IP addresses, sending the same request multiple
times and never succeeding.
• Single-user attacks, consisting of one client generating an
abnormal amount of queries.
• Distributed attacks from several IP clients (even on sepa-
rate networks), that send queries for non-exiting domains,
all containing a particular string.
• Hosts belonging to ISPs or hosting companies that gener-
ate an abnormal amount of traffic.
• IP clients sending queries with non-standard type of query,
such as NULL queries.
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Focusing on which countries generate the traffic and what
query types were used proved to be the most efficient ways to
reveal anomalies. In particular, the great majority of detected
attacks employed NS queries from Sweden and France.
Finally, no significant difference has emerged between anal-
yses performed with single-file time bins and 21-file time bins,
except for a slightly higher number of both correct detections
and false alarms in the latter case.
79

Appendices
81

Appendix A
Dictionary Code
1 #!/usr/bin/python
2
3 import os
4
5 path = ’Registro/data/raw /2016/04/10/00 ’
6 files = os.listdir(path)
7 not_logs = []
8 for file_ in files:
9 if not file_.startswith(’dns_’):
10 not_logs.append(file_)
11 for file_ in not_logs:
12 files.remove(file_)
13 files.sort()
14
15 n_files = 21 # or n_files = 1
16 n_bins = len(files)/n_files
17
18 for index_bin in range(n_bins):
19 db_domain = {}
20 db_IPsrc = {}
21 db_IPsrc24 = {}
83
A – Dictionary Code
22
23 db_countries = {}
24 db_countriesNX = {}
25 db_countriesSF = {}
26
27 db_queryTypes = {}
28 db_retCodes = {}
29
30 for index_file in range(n_files):
31 trace = open(path + ’/’ + files[index_file +
index_bin*n_files], ’r’)
32 file_logs = trace.read()
33 trace.close ()
34 file_logs = file_logs.splitlines ()
35 file_logs = file_logs [3:]
36
37 for line in file_logs:
38 fields = line.split(’\t’)
39
40 if ’.’ in fields [6] and fields [6]. split(’.’)
[-1]. isalpha ():
41 domain = fields [6]. split(’.’)[-2] + ’.’ +
fields [6]. split(’.’)[-1]
42 else:
43 domain = fields [6]
44
45 IPsrc = fields [1]
46 IPsrc24 = ’.’.join(IPsrc.split(’.’)[0:3])
47
48 country = fields [3]
49 queryType = fields [11]
50 retCode = fields [8]
51
52 ######## Dictionary of Domains ########
53 fields = [IPsrc , country , queryType , retCode]
54 keys = [’Num of Queries ’, ’IP clients ’, ’
Countries ’, ’Query Types ’, ’RetCodes ’]
55
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56 if not db_domain.has_key(domain):
57 newDomain = {domain: dict.fromkeys(keys)}
58 newDomain[domain ][’Num of Queries ’] = 1
59 for key , field in zip(keys [1:], fields):
60 newDomain[domain ][key] = {field: 1}
61 db_domain.update(newDomain)
62 else:
63 db_domain[domain ][’Num of Queries ’] += 1
64 for key , field in zip(keys [1:], fields):
65 if db_domain[domain ][key]. has_key(field):
66 db_domain[domain ][key][field] += 1
67 else:
68 db_domain[domain ][key][field] = 1
69
70 ######## Dictonary of IP clients ########
71 fields = [domain , country , queryType , retCode]
72 keys = [’Num of Queries ’, ’Domains ’, ’Countries
’, ’Query Types’, ’RetCodes ’]
73
74 if not db_IPsrc.has_key(IPsrc):
75 newIPsrc = {IPsrc: dict.fromkeys(keys)}
76 newIPsrc[IPsrc ][’Num of Queries ’] = 1
77 for key , field in zip(keys [1:], fields):
78 newIPsrc[IPsrc ][key] = {field: 1}
79 db_IPsrc.update(newIPsrc)
80 else:
81 db_IPsrc[IPsrc ][’Num of Queries ’] += 1
82 for key , field in zip(keys [1:], fields):
83 if db_IPsrc[IPsrc][key]. has_key(field):
84 db_IPsrc[IPsrc ][key][field] += 1
85 else:
86 db_IPsrc[IPsrc ][key][field] = 1
87
88 ######## Dictonary of IP clients /24 ########
89 fields = [domain , country , queryType , retCode]
90 keys = [’Num of Queries ’, ’Domains ’, ’Countries
’, ’Query Types’, ’RetCodes ’]
91
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92 if not db_IPsrc24.has_key(IPsrc24):
93 newIPsrc24 = {IPsrc24: dict.fromkeys(keys)}
94 newIPsrc24[IPsrc24 ][’Num of Queries ’] = 1
95 for key , field in zip(keys [1:], fields):
96 newIPsrc24[IPsrc24 ][key] = {field: 1}
97 db_IPsrc24.update(newIPsrc24)
98 else:
99 db_IPsrc24[IPsrc24 ][’Num of Queries ’] += 1
100 for key , field in zip(keys [1:], fields):
101 if db_IPsrc24[IPsrc24 ][key]. has_key(field):
102 db_IPsrc24[IPsrc24 ][key][field] += 1
103 else:
104 db_IPsrc24[IPsrc24 ][key][field] = 1
105
106
107 ######## Dictonary of Countries ########
108 if not db_countries.has_key(country):
109 newCountry = {country: 1}
110 db_countries.update(newCountry)
111 else:
112 db_countries[country] += 1
113
114 ######## Dictonary of Countries (NX) ########
115 if retCode == ’NXDOMAIN ’:
116 if not db_countriesNX.has_key(country):
117 newCountry = {country: 1}
118 db_countriesNX.update(newCountry)
119 else:
120 db_countriesNX[country] += 1
121
122 ######## Dictonary of Countries (SF) ########
123 if retCode == ’SERVFAIL ’:
124 if not db_countriesSF.has_key(country):
125 newCountry = {country: 1}
126 db_countriesSF.update(newCountry)
127 else:
128 db_countriesSF[country] += 1
129
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130 ######## Dictonary of Query Types ########
131 if not db_queryTypes.has_key(queryType):
132 newQueryType = {queryType: 1}
133 db_queryTypes.update(newQueryType)
134 else:
135 db_queryTypes[queryType] += 1
136
137 ######## Dictonary of Return Codes ########
138 if not db_retCodes.has_key(retCode):
139 newRetCode = {retCode: 1}
140 db_retCodes.update(newRetCode)
141 else:
142 db_retCodes[retCode] += 1
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Appendix B
Clustering Code
B.1 Three-stage k-means
1 import numpy as np
2 import random
3 import scipy.spatial.distance as dist
4 import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
5
6 def threestageKMeans(Y, Y_k , db_ , name , x_label):
7
8 alpha_w = 1.5
9 n_clusters = 10.0
10 n_min = 5
11
12 y = Y[:,0]
13 unique_values = np.unique(y)
14
15 centroids = np.array(sorted(random.sample(
unique_values , int(n_clusters))))
16 W = np.zeros((y.size , centroids.size))
17 D = np.zeros((y.size , centroids.size))
18
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19 ######## EARLY CLUSTERING ########
20
21 n_iter = 0
22 max_iter = 100
23 n_trials = 2
24 max_n_trials = 1
25 not_changed = np.zeros(centroids.size , dtype=np.
bool)
26 while(np.all(not_changed) == False):
27 n_iter += 1
28
29 for row , x in enumerate(y):
30 d = np.zeros(centroids.size)
31 for j in range(d.size):
32 d[j] = dist.euclidean(x, centroids[j])
33 D[row] = d
34
35 if np.all(d):
36 W[row] = (1/d)/np.sum(1/d)
37 else:
38 mask = (d == 0)
39 W[row][mask] = 1
40 W[row][~ mask] = 0
41
42 if not np.all(np.sum((W >= alpha_w *1/ n_clusters),
axis =0)) or (n_iter > max_iter and n_trials <=
max_n_trials):
43 if n_iter > max_iter and n_trials <=
max_n_trials:
44 n_trials += 1
45 if n_trials > max_n_trials:
46 break
47 centroids = np.array(sorted(random.sample(
unique_values , int(n_clusters))))
48 not_changed = np.zeros(centroids.size , dtype=np
.bool)
49 n_iter = 0
50 continue
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51
52 for col , o in enumerate(centroids):
53 mask = (W[:,col] >= alpha_w *1/ n_clusters)
54
55 centroids[col] = np.around(np.sum(W[mask ,col]*y
[mask])/np.sum(W[mask ,col]), 3)
56 if centroids[col] == o:
57 not_changed[col] = True
58 else:
59 not_changed[col] = False
60
61 ######## LATE CLUSTERING ########
62
63 C = (W >= alpha_w *1/ n_clusters)
64
65 for j in range(centroids.size):
66 mask = C[:,j]
67 centroids[j] = np.around(np.sum(y[mask])/np.sum(
mask), 3)
68
69 local_outliers = np.zeros(y.size , dtype=np.bool)
70 for i in range(y.size):
71 if not np.any(C[i]):
72 local_outliers[i] = True
73
74 ######## CLUSTER MERGING ########
75
76 n_iter = 0
77 max_iter = 30
78 while(True):
79 merging = []
80 merging_indices = []
81
82 indices = np.argsort(centroids)
83 centroids.sort()
84 C = C[:,indices]
85 cluster_dim = np.sum(C, axis =0)
86
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87 D = np.zeros ((y.size , centroids.size))
88 sigma = np.zeros(centroids.size)
89 for j in range(centroids.size):
90 for i in range(y.size):
91 D[i,j] = dist.euclidean(y[i], centroids[j])
92 num = np.sum((D[:,j]*C[:,j])**2)
93 den = np.sum(C[:,j]) - 1
94 if den == 0:
95 sigma[j] = 0
96 else:
97 sigma[j] = np.sqrt(num/den)
98
99 for i in range(centroids.size):
100 for j in range(i+1, centroids.size):
101 hp1 = ((2./3.)*sigma[j] < sigma[i] < (3./2.)*
sigma[j])
102 hp2 = (np.sum(C[:,i]*C[:,j]) > 0.125* max(
cluster_dim[i], cluster_dim[j]))
103 if hp1 and hp2:
104 merging.append ((i, j))
105 merging_indices.extend ([i,j])
106
107 n_iter += 1
108 if n_iter > max_iter or merging == []:
109 break
110
111 merging_indices = list(set(merging_indices))
112 matrix = np.zeros((2, len(merging)), dtype=np.int
)
113 for index , p in enumerate(merging):
114 matrix[:,index] = p
115
116 merging = []
117 for j in set(matrix [0]):
118 l = [j]
119 mask = (matrix [0] == j)
120 l.extend(list(matrix [1][ mask]))
121 merging.append(l)
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122
123 merged = []
124 for index , l in enumerate(merging [1:]):
125 double = True
126 for elem in l:
127 if not (elem in merging[index]):
128 double = False
129 break
130 if double:
131 merged.append(l)
132 for l in merged:
133 merging.remove(l)
134
135 not_merging_indices = range(centroids.size)
136 for index in merging_indices:
137 not_merging_indices.remove(index)
138
139 n_centroids = len(merging) + len(
not_merging_indices)
140 centroids_m = []
141 C_m = np.zeros((y.size , n_centroids), dtype=C.
dtype)
142
143 for index , l in enumerate(merging):
144 c = C[:,l[0]]
145 for col in l[1:]:
146 c += C[:,col]
147 C_m[:,index] = c
148 centroids_m.append(np.around(np.mean(y[c]), 3))
149
150 for index , col in enumerate(not_merging_indices):
151 c = C[:,col]
152 C_m[:,index+len(merging)] = c
153 centroids_m.append(centroids[col])
154
155 centroids = np.array(centroids_m)
156 C = C_m
157
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158
159 ######## Exclusive membership ########
160
161 for i in range(y.size):
162 if np.sum(C[i]) > 1:
163 index = np.argmin(D[i])
164 C[i] = np.zeros(centroids.size , dtype=C.dtype)
165 C[i,index] = True
166
167 empty_clusters = []
168
169 for j in range(centroids.size):
170 mask = C[:,j]
171 if np.sum(mask) == 0:
172 empty_clusters.append(j)
173 else:
174 centroids[j] = np.around(np.sum(y[mask])/np.sum
(mask), 3)
175
176 if empty_clusters != []:
177 mask = np.ones(centroids.size , dtype=np.bool)
178 for j in empty_clusters:
179 mask[j] = False
180 centroids = centroids[mask]
181 C = C[:,mask]
182 D = D[:,mask]
183 sigma = sigma[mask]
184
185 ######## n_min points ########
186
187 global_outliers = np.array(local_outliers)
188 outlier_clusters = []
189 for j in range(centroids.size):
190 mask = C[:,j]
191 if np.sum(mask) < n_min:
192 outlier_clusters.append(j)
193 global_outliers += mask
194
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195 if outlier_clusters != []:
196 mask = np.ones(centroids.size , dtype=np.bool)
197 for j in outlier_clusters:
198 mask[j] = False
199 centroids = centroids[mask]
200 C = C[:,mask]
201 D = D[:,mask]
202 sigma = sigma[mask]
203
204 indices = np.argsort(centroids)
205 centroids.sort()
206 C = C[:,indices]
207 D = D[:,indices]
208 sigma = sigma[indices]
209
210 ######## Output Data ########
211
212 cluster_dim = np.sum(C, axis =0)
213 n_outliers = np.sum(global_outliers)
214
215 labels = np.zeros(y.size)
216 for j in range(centroids.size):
217 mask = C[:,j]
218 labels[mask] = j
219 labels[global_outliers] = -1
220
221 cluster_dim = list(np.sum(C, axis =0))
222 cluster_wid = []
223 for j in range(centroids.size):
224 mask = C[:,j]
225 wid = np.max(y[mask]) - np.min(y[mask])
226 cluster_wid.append(wid)
227
228 outliers = []
229 for i in range(len(global_outliers)):
230 if global_outliers[i]:
231 outlier = Y_k[i]
232 outliers.append ((outlier , db_[outlier ]))
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233
234 n_clusters = centroids.size
235
236 clusters_3sk = (n_clusters , centroids , labels , zip(
cluster_dim , cluster_wid), n_outliers , outliers)
237
238 ######## Results plotting ########
239
240 fig = plt.figure ()
241 plt.ylabel(’Number of Queries ’)
242 plt.xticks ([], [])
243 plt.xlabel(x_label)
244
245 colors = plt.cm.Spectral(np.linspace(0, 1, len(set(
labels))))
246 for lab , col in zip(set(labels), colors):
247 class_member_mask = (labels == lab)
248 xy = Y[class_member_mask]
249 axis_y = xy[:,0]
250 axis_x = np.array(np.arange(len(Y[:,0])))[
class_member_mask]
251
252 if lab == -1:
253 col = ’k’
254 legend = str(n_outliers)
255 else:
256 legend = str(np.sum(class_member_mask))
257
258 plt.plot(axis_x , axis_y , ’o’, color = col ,
markersize = 5, label = legend)
259 plt.legend ()
260
261 file_name = name + ’.png’
262 plt.savefig(file_name)
263 plt.close()
264
265 return clusters_3sk
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B.2 DBSCAN
1 import numpy as np
2 from sklearn.cluster import DBSCAN
3 from sklearn.preprocessing import StandardScaler
4 import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
5
6 def DBscan(Y, Y_k , db_ , name , x_label , eps_ ,
min_samples_):
7
8 scaler = StandardScaler ()
9 X = scaler.fit_transform(Y)
10
11 dbscan = DBSCAN(eps = eps_ , min_samples =
min_samples_)
12 dbscan.fit(X)
13 labels = dbscan.labels_
14 unique_labels = set(labels)
15
16 outlier_mask = (labels == -1)
17 n_clusters = len(unique_labels) - np.any(
outlier_mask)
18
19 indices = dbscan.core_sample_indices_
20 core_mask = np.zeros_like(labels , dtype=np.bool)
21 core_mask[indices] = True
22
23 ######## Output Data ########
24
25 y = Y[:,0]
26 cluster_dim = []
27 cluster_wid = []
28 for lab in unique_labels:
29 if lab == -1:
30 continue
31 mask = (labels == lab)
32
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33 dim = np.sum(mask)
34 cluster_dim.append(dim)
35 wid = np.max(y[mask]) - np.min(y[mask])
36 cluster_wid.append(wid)
37
38 n_outliers = np.sum(outlier_mask)
39 outliers = []
40 for index in range(len(outlier_mask)):
41 if outlier_mask[index]:
42 outlier = Y_k[index]
43 outliers.append ((outlier , db_[outlier ]))
44
45 clusters_DB = (n_clusters , core_mask , labels , zip(
cluster_dim , cluster_wid), n_outliers , outliers)
46
47 ######## Results plotting ########
48
49 fig = plt.figure ()
50 plt.ylabel(’Number of Queries ’)
51 plt.xticks ([], [])
52 plt.xlabel(x_label)
53
54 colors = plt.cm.Spectral(np.linspace(0, 1, len(set(
labels))))
55 for lab , col in zip(set(labels), colors):
56 class_member_mask = (labels == lab)
57 if lab == -1:
58 col = ’k’
59 legend = str(n_outliers)
60 else:
61 legend = str(np.sum(class_member_mask))
62
63 xy = Y[class_member_mask & core_mask]
64 axis_y = xy[:,0]
65 axis_x = np.array(np.arange(len(Y[:,0])))[
class_member_mask & core_mask]
66 plt.plot(axis_x , axis_y , ’o’, color = col ,
markersize = 8)
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67
68 xy = Y[class_member_mask & ~core_mask]
69 axis_y = xy[:,0]
70 axis_x = np.array(np.arange(len(Y[:,0])))[
class_member_mask & ~core_mask]
71 plt.plot(axis_x , axis_y , ’o’, color = col ,
markersize = 5, label = legend)
72 plt.legend ()
73
74 file_name = name + ’.png’
75 plt.savefig(file_name)
76 plt.close()
77
78 return clusters_DB
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B.3 Outlier Factor Algorithm
1 import numpy as np
2 import random
3 import scipy.spatial.distance as dist
4 import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
5
6 def OFA(Y, Y_k , db_ , name , x_label , eps_):
7
8 n_pairs = 100
9
10 y = Y[:,0]
11 unique_values = np.unique(y)
12 if unique_values.size % 2 == 0:
13 t = unique_values.size
14 else:
15 t = unique_values.size - 1
16 points = random.sample(unique_values , min(n_pairs
*2, t))
17
18 distances = []
19 while(points != []):
20 distances.append(dist.euclidean(points.pop(),
points.pop()))
21 ex = np.mean(distances)
22 r = random.randint(np.around (0.7* ex), np.around
(0.9* ex))
23
24 clusters = [[0]]
25 centroids = [y[0]]
26
27 for index in range(len((y[1:]))):
28 distances = []
29 for c in centroids:
30 distances.append(dist.euclidean(y[index +1], c))
31 min_d = np.min(distances)
32 j = np.argmin(distances)
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33 if min_d < r:
34 clusters[j]. append(index +1)
35 mask = clusters[j]
36 centroids[j] = np.around(np.mean(y[mask]), 3)
37 else:
38 clusters.append ([index +1])
39 centroids.append(y[index +1])
40
41 outlier_factors = []
42 for i in range(len(centroids)):
43 of = 0
44 for j in range(len(centroids)):
45 if i != j:
46 of += len(clusters[j])*dist.euclidean(
centroids[i], centroids[j])
47 outlier_factors.append(of)
48
49 indices = np.argsort(outlier_factors)
50 centroids = list(np.array(centroids)[indices ])
51 centroids.reverse ()
52 clusters = list(np.array(clusters)[indices ])
53 clusters.reverse ()
54
55 l = []
56 for cluster in clusters:
57 l.append(len(cluster))
58 l = np.cumsum(l) / float(y.size)
59 outlier_clusters = np.array(l < eps_)
60
61 indices = np.argsort(centroids)
62 centroids.sort()
63 clusters = list(np.array(clusters)[indices ])
64 outlier_clusters = outlier_clusters[indices]
65
66 ######## Output Data ########
67
68 n_clusters = len(centroids)
69 labels = np.zeros(y.size)
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70 for j in range(len(clusters)):
71 mask = clusters[j]
72 if outlier_clusters[j] == True:
73 labels[mask] = -1
74 else:
75 labels[mask] = j
76
77 cluster_dim = []
78 cluster_wid = []
79 for lab in set(labels):
80 if lab == -1:
81 continue
82 mask = (labels == lab)
83 dim = len(y[mask])
84 wid = np.max(y[mask]) - np.min(y[mask])
85 cluster_dim.append(dim)
86 cluster_wid.append(wid)
87
88 outlier_mask = (labels == -1)
89
90 n_outliers = np.sum(outlier_mask)
91 outliers = []
92 for index in range(len(outlier_mask)):
93 if outlier_mask[index]:
94 outlier = Y_k[index]
95 outliers.append ((outlier , db_[outlier ]))
96
97 clusters_OFA = (n_clusters , np.array(centroids),
labels , zip(cluster_dim , cluster_wid), n_outliers
, outliers)
98
99 ######## Results plotting ########
100
101 fig = plt.figure ()
102 plt.ylabel(’Number of Queries ’)
103 plt.xticks ([], [])
104 plt.xlabel(x_label)
105
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106 colors = plt.cm.Spectral(np.linspace(0, 1, len(set(
labels))))
107 for lab , col in zip(set(labels), colors):
108 class_member_mask = (labels == lab)
109 xy = Y[class_member_mask]
110 axis_y = xy[:,0]
111 axis_x = np.array(np.arange(len(Y[:,0])))[
class_member_mask]
112
113 if lab == -1:
114 col = ’k’
115 legend = str(n_outliers)
116 else:
117 legend = str(np.sum(class_member_mask))
118
119 plt.plot(axis_x , axis_y , ’o’, color = col ,
markersize = 5, label = legend)
120 plt.legend ()
121
122 file_name = name + ’.png’
123 plt.savefig(file_name)
124 plt.close()
125
126 return clusters_OFA
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Histograms Code
1 #!/usr/bin/python
2
3 import numpy as np
4 import os
5
6 path = ’Registro/data/raw /2016/04/10/00 ’
7 files = os.listdir(path)
8 not_logs = []
9 for file_ in files:
10 if not file_.startswith(’dns_’):
11 not_logs.append(file_)
12 for file_ in not_logs:
13 files.remove(file_)
14 files.sort()
15
16 all_countries = []
17 all_queryTypes = []
18 all_retCodes = []
19 all_countriesNX = []
20 all_countriesSF = []
21
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22 for index in range(len(files)):
23 trace = open(path + ’/’ + files[index], ’r’)
24
25 logs = trace.read()
26 trace.close ()
27 logs = logs.splitlines ()
28 logs = logs [3:]
29 for line in logs:
30 fields = line.split(’\t’)
31
32 country = fields [3]
33 queryType = fields [11]
34 retCode = fields [8]
35
36 if not country in all_countries:
37 all_countries.append(country)
38 if not queryType in all_queryTypes:
39 all_queryTypes.append(queryType)
40 if not retCode in all_retCodes:
41 all_retCodes.append(retCode)
42 if not country in all_countriesNX:
43 all_countriesNX.append(country)
44 if not country in all_countriesSF:
45 all_countriesSF.append(country)
46
47 all_countries.sort()
48 all_queryTypes.sort()
49 all_retCodes.sort()
50 all_countriesNX.sort()
51 all_countriesSF.sort()
52
53 ##################################################
54
55 n_files = 1 # or n_files = 21
56 n_bins = len(files)/n_files
57
58 hists_countries = []
59 hists_queryTypes = []
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60 hists_retCodes = []
61 hists_countriesNX = []
62 hists_countriesSF = []
63
64 for index_bin in range(n_bins):
65 db_countries , db_queryTypes , db_retCodes ,
db_countriesNX , db_countriesSF = get_dict ()
66
67 ###### Histograms of Countries ######
68 y_countries = []
69 l = np.array(all_countries)
70 for country in l:
71 if db_countries.has_key(country):
72 y_countries.append(db_countries[country ])
73 else:
74 y_countries.append (0)
75 y_countries = np.array(y_countries)
76 hists_countries.append(y_countries)
77
78 ###### Histograms of Query Types ######
79 y_queryTypes = []
80 l = np.array(all_queryTypes)
81 for queryType in l:
82 if db_queryTypes.has_key(queryType):
83 y_queryTypes.append(db_queryTypes[queryType ])
84 else:
85 y_queryTypes.append (0)
86 y_queryTypes = np.array(y_queryTypes)
87 hists_queryTypes.append(y_queryTypes)
88
89 ###### Histograms of Return Codes ######
90 y_retCodes = []
91 l = np.array(all_retCodes)
92 for retCode in l:
93 if db_retCodes.has_key(retCode):
94 y_retCodes.append(db_retCodes[retCode ])
95 else:
96 y_retCodes.append (0)
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97 y_retCodes = np.array(y_retCodes)
98 hists_retCodes.append(y_retCodes)
99
100 ###### Histograms of Countries (NXDOMAIN) ######
101 y_countriesNX = []
102 l = np.array(all_countriesNX)
103 for country in l:
104 if db_countriesNX.has_key(country):
105 y_countriesNX.append(db_countriesNX[country ])
106 else:
107 y_countriesNX.append (0)
108 y_countriesNX = np.array(y_countriesNX)
109 hists_countriesNX.append(y_countriesNX)
110
111 ###### Histograms of Countries (SERVFAIL) ######
112 y_countriesSF = []
113 l = np.array(all_countriesSF)
114 for country in l:
115 if db_countriesSF.has_key(country):
116 y_countriesSF.append(db_countriesSF[country ])
117 else:
118 y_countriesSF.append (0)
119 y_countriesSF = np.array(y_countriesSF)
120 hists_countriesSF.append(y_countriesSF)
121
122
123 plot_hist ()
124
125 ############# Hist Spikes #############
126
127 histograms = [hists_countries , hists_queryTypes ,
hists_retCodes , hists_countriesNX ,
hists_countriesSF]
128 all_fields = [all_countries , all_queryTypes ,
all_retCodes , all_countriesNX , all_countriesSF]
129 names = [’Countries -all’, ’Query Types ’, ’Return
Codes ’, ’Countries -NX’, ’Countries -SF’]
130
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131 thresholds_rel = [0.10, 0.10, 0.05, 0.05, 0.03]
132 thresholds_abs = [250, 200, 50, 30, 15]
133
134 if n_files == 21:
135 thresholds_abs = np.array(thresholds_abs)*21
136 thresholds_abs = list(np.array(thresholds_abs ,
dtype=np.int))
137
138 for index , hists in enumerate(histograms):
139 field = all_fields[index]
140
141 hist_0 = np.array(hists[0], dtype=np.float)
142 hist_n = np.array(hists [1:], dtype=np.float)
143
144 abs_diff = np.zeros(hist_n.shape , dtype=hist_n.
dtype)
145 rel_diff = np.zeros(hist_n.shape , dtype=hist_n.
dtype)
146 diff = np.zeros(hist_n.shape , dtype=hist_n.dtype)
147
148 abs_spikes = np.zeros(hist_n.shape , dtype=np.bool)
149 rel_spikes = np.zeros(hist_n.shape , dtype=np.bool)
150 spikes = np.zeros(hist_n.shape , dtype=np.bool)
151
152 rows , cols = hist_n.shape
153 for i in range(rows):
154 diff[i] = hist_n[i] - hist_0
155 abs_diff[i] = abs(hist_n[i] - hist_0)
156
157 for j in range(cols):
158 if hist_0[j] == 0:
159 if abs_diff[i,j] == 0:
160 rel_diff[i,j] = 0
161 else:
162 rel_diff[i,j] = 1
163 else:
164 rel_diff[i,j] = abs_diff[i,j]/ hist_0[j]
165
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166 abs_spikes[i] = (abs_diff[i] >= thresholds_abs[
index ])*(diff[i]>0)
167 rel_spikes[i] = (rel_diff[i] >= thresholds_rel[
index ])*(diff[i]>0)
168 spikes[i] = abs_spikes[i]* rel_spikes[i]
169
170 for j in range(cols):
171 if not spikes[i,j]:
172 hist_0[j] = hist_n[i,j]
173
174
175 f_abs = open(’Spikes/’ + names[index] + ’: Absolute
Spikes.txt’, ’w’)
176 f_rel = open(’Spikes/’ + names[index] + ’: Relative
Spikes.txt’, ’w’)
177 f = open(’Spikes/’ + names[index] + ’: Spikes.txt’,
’w’)
178
179 for i in range(rows):
180 for j in range(cols):
181 if abs_spikes[i,j] or rel_spikes[i,j]:
182 s1 = ’:\ tvariation = +’ + str(int(abs_diff[i,
j])) + ’\t(’ + str(int(np.around(rel_diff[i,j
]*100))) + ’%)\n’
183 s = ’Time bin ’ + str(i+1) + ’:\t’ + field[j]
+ s1
184 if abs_spikes[i,j]:
185 f_abs.write(s)
186 if rel_spikes[i,j]:
187 f_rel.write(s)
188 if spikes[i,j]:
189 f.write(s)
190
191 f_abs.close ()
192 f_rel.close ()
193 f.close()
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